19
Dec
Speaker: Hao Yu (Assistant Professor at School of Economics, Peking University)
Time: December 21st (Thursday) 14:00-15:30pm
Venue: 916 Meeting Room, West Chongde Wing, RUC
Abstract:
The new policy reform in late Qing Dynasty (1907-1911) asked the gentry to pay taxes and levies and provide public goods for domestic areas under the rule of local autonomy. However, a previous government decision, the abolishment of imperial examinations (1905), forced the gentry (mostly local gentry) to lose their channels to promote within the system. The decision weakened their enthusiasm to offer public services, while strengthened their intentions to take advantages from taxes. This paper uses DID method and finds out that after 1907, more popular revolts, especially revolts against taxation exacted by gentry, happened in areas where provincial graduate or local gentry has a larger proportion of population, which is doubled and the growth rate of popular revolt reaches 0.2 times per government office, equaling to 34% of the average. One possible channel may be the existence of adverse selection in the recruitment of public service officials. The higher the level of urbanization of gentry, the richer the government could be. As a result, the effect mentioned above would be more obvious. The key findings of this paper provide support for the studies of elite recruitment, local governance, and the financial capability of the country.
About Speaker:
Hao Yu is an assistant professor at School of Economics, Peking University. Prof. Hao earned a bachelor degree in economics from Peking University, Ph.D. in economic history from University of California, Davis. His studies mainly focus on economic history, political economics, and development economics. His papers have been published on journals such as Explorations in Economic History.