[IISS.PKU] Zuo Xiying: America’s whole-of-government strategy on China and its implications

The Trump Administration gradually set the tone of China-U.S. strategic competition in his first term as a whole-of-government strategy on China is brewing. Instead of the previous engagement strategy, the United States now turns to strategic competition with China, gathering all the tools of diplomacy, economy, intelligence, law and military to rival against the rising Asian giant. Historically, the adjustment of the US’s China strategy is of great implications.

The ongoing whole-of-government strategy on China

The US Congress, Trump Administration and think tanks jointly contribute to the formation of the whole-of-government strategy on China.

Recently, the US Congress deeply affected the orientation of China policy through a variety of means of lawmaking, resolutions and hearings, including the passage of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Taiwan Travel Act, and Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act.

Trump Administration’s China policy mainly focused on three points: first, exerting more pressure on China in west pacific region by frequent and normalized navigation of warships to South China Sea and Taiwan Strait; second, pressing on Chinese economic structural issues in China-US trade talks; third, targeting Chinese individual high-tech enterprises like Huawei globally with its influence on allies and other countries.

American think tanks, Hudson Institute, CSIS, AEI, Heritage Foundation, and The Project 2049 Institute, mobilized by the government swim with the tide. Only a few observers still speak up for China unbiased, reflecting evidently the current political situation in Washington.

The purpose of America’s whole-of-government strategy on China

First of all, Trump Administration aims to integrate all the strategic resources from federal and state government to the whole society, in all sectors and all levels, so as to fight back fairly as many elites argue that China’s strategic approach on the U.S. is a whole-of-government.

Second, the U.S. could mobilize the public more efficiently by publicize and even exaggerate the threats of China in fields of politics, economy, and military, building a strong consensus of the government and people.

Third, as the Administration and Congress are often divided in opinions, a whole-of-government strategy on China will amend their differences and take coordinated moves in foreign policy.

Some specific performance of the whole-of-government strategy on China

In general, the strategy represents a new narrative on China policy, and China is stereotyped and demonized. Political correctness will further weaken the voices of the doves and the prudent. Specifically, the strategy changed the bottom line of America’s China policy. The tacit understanding on such sensitive issues as Taiwan and South China Sea is replaced by uncertain vague policies, making China rather confused with the political intentions of its counterpart.

Meanwhile, Trump Administration and Congress have adopted multiple policy tools to press China, including sanction against the Equipment Development Department of China, approval of arm sales to Taiwan, increasing warship navigation to the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, extradition of Chinese intelligent agents, arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. All these moves show that the U.S. is doing everything possible and necessary to compete with China.

Regarding to bilateral economic relations, China and the U.S. mainly jostle for global trade, high technology, and international trade rules to be reshaped after the WTO reform.

Finally, in great power competition, the United States strengthens the role of its allies like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, who share similar values and strategic interests with the U.S..

The implications of America’s whole-of-government strategy on China

While the strategy is still under progress, China needs to correctly see how it will evolve in order to make preparations for a rainy day.

First, in less than two years, American elites from the Congress to Administration, think tanks to media largely reach a new consensus on China policy. Once new understanding turned from cooperation to confrontation, the relations of two countries will go downward. Given China’s industrial landscape and huge market, a decoupling of bilateral economies seems unlikely in three to five years. Yet if American strategists insist on decoupling, political confrontation obviously will be intensified.

In the coming year, the game between the two powers concerning new economic issues such as China’s market economy status, high-tech competition, and WTO rules will be fiercer. The US would prefer exerting sustained pressures on China to one-off trade talk, at the same time, more measures will be taken to sound out China’s intentions in security and political sectors.

Therefore, besides trade disputes, other issues like Taiwan, South China Sea, human rights, and people-to-people exchanges shall also be paid more attention to. As China and the US get more familiar with each other’s approaches and tactics during the time-consuming trade negotiation, the overall situation of trade talk will be under control. However, if domestic and global landscape changes, there is still strategic space for enhancing bilateral relations.