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MaySince President Trump came to power till now, his Asia-Pacific strategy has been delayed. Until the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vietnam in November 2017, Trump put forward the concept of “Indo-Pacific”. However, it is not linked to the word “strategy.” In the “National Security Strategy Report” at the end of 2017, the vocabulary linked to “Indo-Pacific” is “region”. Therefore, although the international community, including China's strategic circles, is highly concerned about Trump's vision of Indo-Pacific, it is difficult to determine that the idea of Indo-Pacific put forward by Trump has completely replaced the Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy became the core of U.S new Asia Pacific-Indo-Pacific strategy.
However, whether it is a current concept or a strategy for the future, the intention that “Indo-Pacific” strategy is designed to counter rising China is very clear. Its construction of a security cooperation mechanism between the United States, Japan, Australia and India poses potential challenges to China economically and geopolitically. China should take precautions. While maintaining its commitment to the U.S. strategy, it must actively prepare for neighboring diplomacy, especially for neighboring big countries.
Plan for Neighboring Big Countries Diplomacy
First of all, take the initiative to manage the relations between China and India, China and Japan and other major countries. For a long time, influenced by multiple factors, China’s peripheral diplomatic resources have been more heavily invested in small and medium-sized countries and their regional organizations, and economic diplomacy has been the focus. Apart from Sino-Russian relations, China’s diplomacy with neighboring big countries is always crisis-oriented and defensive, and even there is a view in the society that only if Sino-U.S. relations are well maintained, Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Japanese relations are guaranteed, which does not recognize the independence of Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Japanese relations and lack the motivation for plan and shape neighboring big countries diplomacy. This kind of thinking and layout of neighboring diplomacy obviously cannot adapt to the increasingly serious geo-strategic competition that exists around China. To this end, we should, on the premise of adhering to the diplomatic strategic guidelines of neighboring countries and on the basis of maintaining and strengthening the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of cooperation, improve our ability to take initiative in planning and shaping relations between China and India, China and Japan and other major countries.
India is an important neighboring country in western China and a rising world power. Its resources, development prospects and national aspirations should not be ignored. However, compared with India’s important strategic value, China has under-recognized and understood about India for a long time, and it has not paid enough attention to India’s strategic intentions and strategic influence. In the new era, we need to look at the Sino-Indian relations from the perspective of the traditional triangle relationship between China, India, and Pakistan and put Sino-India relations under a global perspective. In particular, with Trump's upcoming Indo-Pacific strategy, we must attach more importance on our India’s strategy and encourage India to maintain its strategic autonomy. At the same time, we must go beyond the specific topics of the Sino-Indian border dispute and develop from a wider range of issues Sino-India relations; We must also strengthen our extensive contacts with Indian society, strengthen education, tourism and economic and trade exchanges, and consolidate the public opinion base of China-India relations.
In particular, we must take care of each other’s core concerns. We must now flexibly deal with the differences on the Belt and Road and do not have to force India to accept the “Belt and Road” initiative. The current public opinion in China has a tendency to be vigilant, to regard whether India’s acceptance the One Belt One Road Initiative as an indicator of their friendliness to China (the AIIB has similar thinking). The countries that do not accept China's Belt and Road Initiative are regarded as opponents, and countries that did not accept what is now acceptable may be regarded as a victory for progress and our diplomacy.
It is also of great significance to deal with Sino-Japanese relations in the new era. We must fully understand the independence of Sino-Japanese relations. Although the Abe administration has a strong dependence on U.S. diplomacy, U.S.-Japan relations remain the backbone of Japan’s diplomacy, but Sino-Japanese relations have their own development momentum and evolution logic. Japan is not in sync with the United States on all issues. We must pay full attention to the autonomy of Sino-Japanese relations and jump out of US-Japanese relations to see China-Japan relations. At the same time, we must also look beyond the specific issues in Sino-Japanese relations, and in particular, we must not allow territorial disputes and historical issues to abduct the overall situation of China-Japan relations. To prevent radical nationalist sentiment from interfering with the development of Sino-Japanese relations, it is necessary to prevent both domestic Japanese and domestic Chinese, to consolidate the public opinion basis of Sino-Japanese relations, and to improve and enhance the active recognition of each other's nationals.
At present, China-India and China-Japan relations have ushered in a crucial period for improvement and development. China and India, China and Japan have all achieved high-level meetings, which has injected new vitality into the two bilateral relations that have been stagnating for many years. This is not only the result of the active foreign policy of our neighboring countries, but also the consideration of India and Japan taking the initiative to adjust the situation. In any case, we must maintain the current good momentum of Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations and actively manage the relations between China and Japan, China and India, and other major neighboring countries.
Consolidate the Relationship with Southeast Asia
At the same time, further develop China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries. Geographically speaking, Southeast Asia is the hub linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It has always been an important geostrategic value in China's peripheral diplomacy. It is an important channel for the implementation of the China’s BRI and is also a core region that may break the US Indo-Pacific strategy. At present, it is a favorable period for China to develop Southeast Asian relations. First, Trump’s Southeast Asian strategy has not yet been fully formed. Trump’s government for Obama’s strategy, especially its economic strategy, has basically been overturned, causing Southeast Asian countries to doubt the strategic intentions, strategic priorities, and strategic determination of the United States and making a certain impact for their “both-side betting” strategy. Southeast Asian countries are faced with the readjustment of diplomacy. Second, China's One Belt One Road initiative has shown initial influence. Although Southeast Asian countries are also controversial on the One Belt One Road Initiative, the overall attitude is still relatively positive. We hope that we can seize the development opportunities of the Belt and Road to develop ourselves quickly. Third, the South China Sea dispute that used to dominate the agenda of China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries has been in a relatively stable period in recent years. The two leading South Sea countries, the Philippines and Vietnam, have not followed the United States. The "free cruise" has escalated the dispute on the South China Sea. All this has provided us with an opportunity to enhance our ability to shape Southeast Asia.
At present, we should further strengthen our economic radiation and influence. Although economic interdependence does not necessarily lead to mutual understanding and support in politics and security, it is for small and medium-sized countries that need more economic development in Southeast Asia. The economic influence still cannot be ignored. To further improve the ability to consolidate multilateral mechanisms, especially in the context of the United States withdrawing from the TPP, we have made it more important to realize the multilateral mechanisms of Southeast Asian countries; Working together, taking full account of the psychological impact of China’s rise on the small and medium-sized countries in Southeast Asia, through long-term and meticulous work, to promote Southeast Asian countries’ expectations and recognition of China’s peace development strategy.
Maintain the Diplomatic Strategy of the United States
Of course, diplomatic relations with the United States must still maintain its strategic strength. Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is still at the stage of conception and it is far from becoming a mature strategic plan. At present, the U.S. core security concern in the Western Pacific Region is still the North Korean nuclear issue. Judging from the latest trends in the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the United States believes that China still has considerable influence on the North Korean nuclear issue. During the forthcoming talks between the DPRK and the United States, the United States needs China to play a role in promoting North Korea completely abandon the nuclear issue in North Korea. We continue to seek the support China has given in the past. Therefore, in terms of security, the United States does not want to overstimulate China too much, especially in the context of the current Sino-U.S. trade friction that has seriously deteriorated the atmosphere of Sino-US strategic relations.
In addition, the game between the domestic political groups in the United States is still in progress. Despite the preponderance of hard-liners for China in the national security and economic team, there is no complete agreement on the agenda setting for what kind of tough measures China will adopt.
Moreover, based on the regional differences in the situation, the bilateral characteristics of the US security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region after World War II are different from the multilateral mechanisms in the transatlantic NATO. The United States has relatively little experience and capability in building and maintaining multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on this, in view of the United States' strategic vision for Indo-Pacific, we must not only take precautions and take the initiative to plan for the relations between neighboring major powers, but also maintain sufficient rationality and determination to proceed from the grand strategy and maintain the strategic stability of Sino-US relations.
(The author is research fellow of National Academy of Development and Strategy, RUC and professor of School of International Studies in RUC)
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