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21

Aug

2019

[Morning Post] Ma Liang: How will Asia Realize Inclusive Growth?

Against the backdrop of the reverse tide in economic globalization and the aggregation of international inequality, the growth and development inclusiveness has become a major issue hotly discussed by various circles, as is the case for Asia in rising. Recently, under the invitation of the Centre for New Inclusive Asia (CNIA), I participated in the international dialogue activities held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The conference theme of “Interconnectivity and Inclusive Growth” did not include the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but all participants repeatedly talked about it without exception, fully indicating the potential value of BRI in moving ahead with inclusive growth in Asia.  

Before the BRI was proposed, many countries, including Japan, India, the U.S. and Russia, put forward different editions of multilateral cooperation strategies, expecting to realize interconnectivity and coordinated development among countries in the Asia-Pacific Region, such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Russian Transnational Railway Network, Eurasian Economic Corridor and ASEAN’s Asia-Pacific Plan, etc. Obviously, BRI is a latecomer in the Asia-Pacific multilateral cooperation programs, and an optional one of them.

In the aspect of Asia-Pacific Region integration, BRI is not the first, and will not be the last. Compared with existing strategies, however, BRI’s achievements and future potentials are worth noting though it was just proposed not long before.  

Why BRI has been identified rapidly and widely is highly related with several characteristics of its design philosophy and execution mechanism. First, BRI is open and inclusive, rather than the closed member clubs under some strategies before it. Second, BRI emphasizes multilateral peace, and advocates consultation, contribution and shared benefits. China is the initiator and main driving force of BRI, but all other participants can feel the cooperative atmosphere of voluntary, equality and mutual benefit.

In addition, BRI is more driven by economic and trade prospects and interests, different from some previous strategies with strong political and ideological colors, making it focus on actual effects in the manner of dealing with relevant affairs on their merits. Finally, BRI, as a latecomer, has late-developing advantage, and absorbs and draws on the experience of previous different-edition Asia-Pacific strategies, helping it make best use of the advantages and bypass the disadvantages and incorporate things of diverse nature.

It is only natural that BRI inevitably suffered many misunderstanding, queries even boycotts in the course of advancement, which are also the challenges that any multilateral cooperation mechanism may meet. BRI is embraced by firm identifiers and supporters, but some different even opposite voices exist. In particular, countries along the Belt and Road are highly different in geo-politics, historical origin and economic ties, meaning great economic, political and cultural “gaps” and therefore more severe challenges.  

First, over a very long period in the future, BRI will have to compete, cooperate and coexist with other Asia-Pacific multilateral mechanisms, though it strongly presents the momentum that latecomers surpass the old-timers. Particularly, BRI competes with even rival with different strategies proposed by Japan, the U.S., India, Russia and ASEAN, so it is needed to consider how to seek common ground while reserving differences and coexist for a long time.  

Many of the infrastructure construction plans involved in BRI are overlapped or related to the multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific Region, which BRI should not and is hard to replace. Deeply studying and comparing different strategies and obtaining the greatest common divisor, even jointly developing and making use of the infrastructure and cooperation platforms accumulated by existing strategies, will not only be able to reduce the challenge and resistance facing BRI, but be helpful for cutting down its advancement cost.

Second, interconnectivity does not mean transport infrastructure and economic and trade investment as well as other hardware only, but are more related with many “soft infrastructure”. Some participants pointed out by taking Sri Lanka as an example: the so-called “Debt Trap” is nothing but a political label stuck by Western media with their ulterior motives, and is not supported by any credible basis itself. On the other hand, however, China still needs to develop its capacities in operation and maintenance of infrastructure including port, railway and airport, particularly when meeting some large-sized projects. It is true that China can “accommodate” such projects, but whether the cooperation partners can “afford” them needs to be demonstrated fully. All cooperative projects should not be ended up by doing nothing except for completion. Otherwise blaming each other and passing the buck to each other will come once any problem occurs, which will make it unable to move even a single step in further cooperation.

In terms of economic return and social influence of BRI projects, China also needs meticulous planning, should neither only play the political card without considering economic value or just aim at economic interests but neglect environmental pollution and social instability. Some countries along the Belt and Road have difficulties such as political upheaval, government corruption, governance failure and social tear, which BRI should not be blind to, but should incorporate into the agenda for continuous improvement of state governance and social administration.

Interconnectivity as proposed in BRI is also embodied in spiritual communication and exchange at cultural and civilization levels, but current problems therein are that the communication is superficial and deep communication between different civilizations is deficient. Attentions should be paid to value cultural dignity of all countries, big or small, which China should attach high importance to and properly handle, so as to avoid bringing out any disagreement and grudge due to power inequality and cultural difference between countries.

Third, it is needed to consider how to optimize BRI knowledge management to avoid repetitive payment for failure by governments and enterprises. In view of the essence, BRI means transnational cooperation and communication at multiple levels. Such practice is nothing new. Over the past decades, developed countries such as Japan and many transnational corporations have carried out numerous practices, made a lot of mistakes, suffered many privations and accumulated rich experiences in investment and financing, park governance, project management and cross-cultural integration.

Circumstances have changed with the lapse of time, but many rules for and principles and processes of transnational cooperation have remained unchanged since their appearance up to now. BRI needs to review the course and accumulate, go over, digest and utilize the established knowledge, and further accumulate and enrich relevant knowledge when moving ahead with new projects, to properly handle accumulation, utilization and transfer of any knowledge about transnational cooperation.

Meanwhile, relevant authorities should provide domestic and foreign think tanks and consulting institutions with an open space, for them to be able to conduct more independent assessment and scientific researches, prepare reliable and convincing decision-making and communication bases for BRI-related effects and risks. For example, some participants carried out rigorous quantitative assessment of projects including Singapore-Malaysia-Thailand High-speed Rail and Malaysia’s East Coastal Railway, offering the reference for cost sharing and industrial layout.

Some scholars studied China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China-Thailand Railway as well as other projects, disclosed authentic evidences of employees, investment structure and governance architecture of relevant enterprises, clarifying those some people do not understand misunderstand. Such kind of policy assessment and studies can offset some politician and media’s rash criticism against and purely fictitious suspicion of BRI, and make it supported and identified by more people and parties.  

Finally, what is worth noting is how to make the friend circle of BRI bigger and build a good public opinion environment for smooth advancement of BRI. A few participants talked about some people’s misinterpretation and misunderstanding of BRI, which is related with Western media’s demonization of it, and also with insufficient propaganda and spreading efforts of China. Chinese media and scholars are far behind the enterprises and projects which have gone abroad, and have conducted studies of and communication with countries along the Belt and Road far less than those necessary. Chinese engineers have constructed so many projects in other countries, but the voice of China has not gone abroad.

The monopoly and prejudice as characteristics of Western media have made BRI highly controversial, but BRI-related propaganda and communication by China are hard to contend with them. When discussing specific situations of every country along the Belt and Road, very few Chinese experts are available, and rare experts are in deep and thorough studies concerned, so it is very hard for them to offer intelligent supports for the government’s decision-making and media’s voice. Isolation of social groups has led to many misjudgments of Chinese scholars and media workers. With isolate interactive friend circles they are very hard to keep a lasting interaction and mutual trust with mainstream international friend circles.

China has long passed the stage of “making big fortune in a quiet and inconspicuous way” and “hiding our capacities and biding our time” characterized by “doing without talking”, so the diplomacy, propaganda and study must be transformed substantially accompanying BRI before they are suitable for pressing needs of new strategy. Higher transparency, sense of dialogue and interactive participation, and spreading with the words and forms popular among international audience are the fields that BRI is short of and must enhance particularly.

In the course of BRI development, the power of overseas Chinese friend circle cannot be neglected, and the Chinese government should make great efforts to attach importance to and summarize lessons and experiences in the aspect. For example, who lead discussions about BRI on Twitter are not Chinese media and scholars, but enthusiastic overseas Chinese think tanks. Therefore, we should make an overall plan to take advantages of various powers both at home and abroad to give publicity to and acclaim BRI.  

(The author is a Research Fellow at the National Academy of Development and Strategy, and a Professor at the School of Public Administration and Policy, RUC.)

Link to the original article: http://www.zaobao.com/forum/views/opinion/story20190821-982649